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HERACLITUS, PLATO, AND THE 
PHILOSOPHIC DOGS (A NOTE ON 
REPUBLIC II, 375E-376C)
RESUMO: Este artigo focaliza uma instância negligen-
ciada da recepção platônica de Heráclito na República (II, 
375e-376c), e tenta mostrar que é provável que a passagem 
de Platão seja uma alusão a B 97 de Heráclito («Os cães 
ladram para quem eles não conhecem») e B 85 («É difícil 
lutar contra o thymos, pois o que se almeja com isso se 
paga com ψυχή). A principal reivindicação é que com o 
uso que faz da imagem de cães, Platão volta os seus olhos 
para Heráclito, e convida a explorar de a possibilidade que 
pelo menos alguns elementos da Kallipolis de Platão possam 
derivar de Heráclito - especialmente alguns fragmentos éti-
cos e políticos. Uma breve pesquisa acerca desses elementos 
sugere haver uma profunda afinidade filosófica entre os dois 
autores em diversas áreas importantes (como a chamada 
«psicologia moral» e o «intelectualismo ético»), e questiona 
o lugar comum da interpretação tradicional de Heráclito 
como um defensor da moral aristocrática.
PALAVRAS -CHAVE: Platão, Heráclito, cães, thymos, 
phylakes, demos, polloi, aristoi.
ABSTRACT: The paper focuses on a neglected instance 
of the Platonic reception of Heraclitus in the Republic (II, 
375e-376c), trying to show that it’s likely that Plato’s 
passage makes an allusion to Heraclitus’ B97 (“Dogs bark 
at whom they don’t know”) and B85 (“It’s difficult to fight 
θυμός, for what it longs for it pays with ψυχή”). The main 
Although the influence of Heraclitus on the 
ancient philosophical tradition can be taken for 
granted as a matter of fact, it’s often hard to pin it 
down with enough precision in every instance. Pos-
sibly one of the most revealing test cases is Plato, 
in whose written works there is a deeply-embedded, 
opaque image of Heraclitus, widely acknowledged 
in the Cratylus and the Theaetetus (which contain 
seven of the nine explicit mentions by name in 
the dialogues and attribute him certain famous 
doctrines
1
). Actually, the presence of Heraclitus in 
Plato goes far beyond these two dialogues, and can 
be detected in a considerable number of the writings 
in the Corpus Platonicum
2
. As a rule, Plato doesn’t 
quote Heraclitus much and when he does, he doesn’t 
give his words exactly and fully, but adapts them 
to his own context, substantially transforming the 
originals. Scholarship has not been particularly keen 
on detecting the relevance of Heraclitus’ art and 
thought in the Republic, although it might turn out 
to be important for a right understanding of Plato’s 
own philosophical message at several crucial points 
of the argument (particularly books V-VII). In what 
follows, I will not even attempt a rough general 
sketch of the latter aspect, but will deal instead 
with just one instance of the reception of Heraclitus 
in book II (375e-376c). This note sets out to show 
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claim is that Plato’s use of the image of dogs looks back to 
Heraclitus, which invites an exploration of the possibility 
that at least some elements of Plato’s kallipolis might 
derive from Heraclitus – particularly from some ethical and 
political fragments. A brief survey of these suggests a deep 
philosophical affinity among the two authors in several 
important areas (as the so-called ‘moral psychology’ and 
‘ethical intellectualism’), and questions the commonplace 
traditional interpretation of Heraclitus as a defender of 
aristocratic morality.
KEYWORDS: Plato, Heraclitus, dogs, thymos, phylakes, 
demos, polloi, aristoi.
that it’s likely that Plato’s passage on the philo-
sophic dogs makes an allusion to Heraclitus (DK22 
B97: “Dogs bark at whom they don’t recognize”). 
In what concerns the interpretation of Heraclitus 
enigmatic dictum, Plato seems to give a different 
side of the philosophy of the Ephesian, suggesting 
an anthropological (ethical and political) context of 
application.  I’ll argue that Plato’s use of the image 
of dogs looks back to and sheds light on Heraclitus’ 
thought, and explore the possibility that some 
elements of Plato’s kallipolis might be connected 
to ideas in Heraclitus. Inter-textual analysis calls 
for a fair assessment of the relevant texts of both 
authors, which is not an easy task, each one of them 
being difficult to interpret in their own right. The 
influence of Heraclitus on Plato and the Platonic 
reception of Heraclitus constitute a territory not 
often visited by interpreters and commentators, 
sometimes slippery and always full of hermeneutical 
challenges. So: Cave canes! 
The project of designing in thought an ideal 
polis is conceived precisely in book II of Plato’s 
Republic (369c ff.), as the course that the search 
for the nature of justice must follow, yielding as 
a general answer (in book IV, 443c-d) the inner 
ἁρμονία both of the soul and the city. A quick look 
at book II as a whole shows an obvious surfacing 
of a well-known (though not unique) Heraclitean 
theme, in the specific criticism of Homer and Hesiod, 
leading to censorship and eventual banishment of 
politically incorrect poetry from the καλλίπολις 
— as it is later called (V, 527c2) —, because of the 
harmful effects of the immoral and false depiction 
of the gods in their mythological tales
3
. Pre-Socratic 
influences here should include Xenophanes
4
 in 
the first place, but a harsh attitude towards the 
founding fathers of Greek παιδεία — extended to 
Xenophanes himself — is also very conspicuous in 
some Heraclitean fragments
5
. Plato’s own criticism 
of traditional poetry comes up as part of the initial 
development of the appropriate παιδεία for the 
young Guardians (φύλακες, introduced at 374d). 
At this early stage of the long narrative argument 
these “Guardians” refer to the emerging class of 
professional soldiers in the “luxurious” or “swollen” 
city
6
, resulting from the fast-growing needs of the 
imagined community of citizens and a combination 
of factors such as overpopulation, the consequent 
need to make war, and the principle of division of 
work according to each one’s natural abilities. Later 
on, an élite of philosopher-kings will gradually de-
velop out of these primitive Guardians (who will be 
then distinguished from the shepherds, and referred 
to as “helpers”
7
), and eventually become the ruling 
class, coming into full view in book V. For the time 
being, besides the producers and craftsmen, there 
is only this class in charge of warfare (offensive and 
defensive), which will be expected to enforce law 
and order within the state, and to act always with 
the interest of the whole city in mind. 
Before getting to the question of the rear-
ing, training and right education of the Guardians, 
the interlocutors face the preliminary problem of 
the mere possibility of breeding good watch-dogs 
for the city, fierce and ‘high-spirited’. At 374a-b, 
Socrates insists that in every case, whether horse, 
dog or any other animal, there’s no courageousness 
without a high-spirited nature; for, he tells the 
impetuous Glaucon: 
Don’t you know spirit (θυμός) is an invincible thing 
that no one wants to fight with, and that its presence 
makes every soul (ψυχή) fearless and unconquerable 
in the face of every danger?
8
 
Socrates’ revealing connection of θυμός and 
ψυχή anticipates the moral psychology of book IV, 
where ψυχή is the broader concept and θυμός is 
one of its constituent parts
9
. Perhaps significantly, 
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Socrates may be evoking a famous saying of Heracli-
tus (B85): “It’s hard to fight passion (θυμός), for 
what it longs for, it pays with soul (ψυχή)”. That 
Heraclitus’ saying is in Plato’s mind here is sug-
gested by the close lexical parallelism among Plato’s 
ἄμαχόν τε καὶ ἀνίκητον θυμός and Heraclitus’ 
θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χαλεπόν, and reinforced by 
the idea of ψυχή as the epistemic subject and the 
moral agent, so prominently held by Plato’s Socrates. 
The starting-point of our passage is the as-
similation of the natures of the Guardians-to-be 
and dogs of a good breed (375a). Guardians should 
possess the same qualities as good dogs — gentle-
ness towards the οἰκείοι and not only fierceness 
towards strangers. Socrates now asks where can 
they find such a character that is both “gentle 
and high-spirited” (πρᾷον καὶ μεγαλόθυμον 
ἦθος, 375c5). Since these qualities have contrary 
natures (ἐναντία γάρ που θυμοειδεῖ πρᾳεῖα 
φύσις, 375c5-6), and granting that without such 
a combination “a good Guardian will not come to 
be” (φύλαξ ἀγαθὸς οὐ μὴ γένηται, 375c8), the 
argument comes to a standstill, concluding that 
guardianship would be “impossible” (ἀδύνατον, 
375d1). (It’s worth noticing the inference requires 
an additional premise, that of the mutual exclusion 
of contraries, which remains implicit.) Socrates 
pauses for a moment, going over what was said 
before and recognizing the difficulty. Before long, 
he finds the answer has been there all along, for the 
very image (εἰκών, 375d5) of the city-Guardians as 
dogs, he argues, provides a way out of the difficulty, 
and a solid basis for the possibility of good guardian-
ship based on such a “nature” or “character”,
[socrates] [375e] As you know, the character (τὸ 
ἦθος) of dogs of a good breed is by nature (φύσει) 
this: they are most gentle with those habitually around 
and who are better known (τοὺς συνήθεις τε καὶ 
γνωρίμους) to them, but they are the opposite way 
with those they don’t know (τοὺς ἀγνῶτας).
[Glaucon] I know it well.
[soc.] Then, this is possible, and we aren’t searching 
against nature (οὐ παρὰ φύσιν) for such a Guardian.
[Gl.] It doesn’t seem so.
[soc.] Don’t you think that the man who is to be 
our Guardian still needs this: to become in his nature 
a lover of wisdom (φιλόσοφος τὴν φύσιν), besides 
being high-spirited (τῷ θυμοειδεῖ)? 
[376a]  [Gl.] What? I don’t understand. 
[soc.] This, precisely, you can see in dogs, and it’s 
something worthy of admiration in a beast.
[Gl.] What do you mean?
[soc.] That when a dog sees a stranger, he gets 
angry (ὃν μὲν ἂν ἴδῃ ἀγνῶτα, χαλεπαίνει), even if 
he hasn’t received any harm from him. But when it’s 
someone known, he greets him (ὃν δ' ἂν γνώριμον, 
ἀσπάζεται), even if he never benefitted from him. 
Or have you never wondered about this?  
[Gl.] I had not until now turned my attention to 
the matter. But it’s obvious that he behaves this way.
[soc.] Still, it shows a fine quality [376b] of his 
nature (τὸ πάθος αὐτοῦ τῆς φύσεως) and that he 
truly is a lover of wisdom (ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφον).
[Gl.] In what manner?
[soc.] In so far as he distinguishes the friendly 
from the hostile aspect (ὄψιν … φίλην καὶ ἐχθρὰν 
διακρίνει) by nothing else than by his knowing 
(καταμαθεῖν) the one and his ignorance (ἀγνοῆσαι) 
of the other. And how would he not be a lover of 
learning (φιλομαθὲς), since he defines the friendly 
and the alien by understanding and by ignorance 
(συνέσει τε καὶ ἀγνοίᾳ ὁριζόμενον τό τε οἰκεῖον 
καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον)?
[Gl.] In no wise, he would not.
[soc.] But lover of learning and lover of wisdom 
are the same?
[Gl.] The same, indeed.
[soc.] Then, may we be confident in establishing 
this also for man, that if someone is likely [376c] to 
be gentle to familiars and friends, he must be by na-
ture a lover of wisdom and a lover of learning (φύσει 
φιλόσοφον καὶ φιλομαθῆ αὐτὸν δεῖν εἶναι)?
[Gl.] Let’s establish this.
[soc.] Then, he who is to become the fine and noble 
Guardian of our city shall be by nature a lover of wis-
dom, high-spirited (Φιλόσοφος δὴ καὶ θυμοειδὴς… 
τὴν φύσιν), quick and strong.
10
.
The philosophical significance of the pas-
sage has been often overlooked and minimized, 
with occasional exceptions.
11
 The main point of 
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the comparison, prompted by the pun φύλαξ-
σκύλαξ, seems clear enough: the natures (φύσεις, 
375a7) that qualify to be good Guardians, besides 
being fierce, must also be gentle with one another 
and with the citizens. That is, they should be like 
dogs of a good breed, in so far as these exhibit a 
naturally gentle and ‘philosophical’ disposition, as 
shown by their ability to (successfully) distinguish 
friend from foe based solely on the criterion of 
knowledge and ignorance. Etymological word-play 
at 376b suggests two different senses in which the 
word φιλόσοφος (used here for the first time in 
the Republic) can be taken: as ‘lover of wisdom’ (or 
‘friend of the wise’, the traditional reading
12
) and as 
‘wise about friends’
13
 (an alternative that, however 
far-fetched as it may sound, makes good sense in 
context). The nature or character of dogs can be 
termed “philosophic” merely because it implies a 
gentler psychic disposition that tempers their fierce-
ness, a cognitive and rational faculty to balance the 
blind force of θυμός. Since the double analogy of 
Guardians with dogs and of dogs with philosophers 
comes to the oblique identification of Guardians and 
philosophers, the final point looks like an early and 
somewhat comical preview of the central thesis of 
book V, that philosophy and kingship must coincide 
in the same individuals (473c-d). The way the idea 
is put forward here is clearly playful, and calling 
dogs “philosophers” doubtless has an ironical edge, 
but the image can hardly be just an inconsequential 
silly joke of Plato’s
14
. For one thing, the likening 
of the Guardians and dogs is notoriously recurrent, 
and it anticipates especially important themes to 
be developed later on (i.e. internal conflict and 
harmony of the tripartite soul and the tripartite 
polis, centered in θυμός and personified by the 
Guardians as an intermediate social class and 
the detailed characterization of the philosopher 
ruler). Plato’s would seem to be a positive use of 
the image, especially if it is a proleptic wink at 
the central thesis of Platonic political philosophy, 
that “philosophers become kings in the cities, or 
those whom are called now kings and rulers become 
philosophers” (473c11-d2). But Plato’s apparently 
straightforward positive use of the image may be 
more nuanced than would seem at first sight. It 
would be well to remember that the identification of 
philosophers and rulers (or, in more abstract terms, 
the conjunction of “political power and philosophy”, 
δύναμίς τε πολιτικὴ καὶ φιλοσοφία, 473d3) is 
in fact introduced as a paradoxical tenet (cf. 472a6: 
παράδοξον λόγον, 473e4: πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν 
ῥηθήσεται), and for good reasons (that is, not 
only because philosophical πολιτική would be 
the opposite of factual political practice, but also 
because the respective natures of the philosopher 
and the statesman are worlds apart). 
Furthermore, there is a distinct possibility 
that Plato alludes at 376a to Heraclitus B97
15
: 
For dogs bark just at whom [or: ‘at what’] they 
don’t recognize
16
.
This brief sentence was preserved by Plutarch 
(An seni resp., 787c), whose use of the imagery sug-
gests the opposite type of behavior — being gentle 
with friends and acquaintances — in a social and 
political context
17
. Strictly speaking, although it 
has often been thought to convey a criticism, the 
preserved sentence by itself does not voice an ex-
plicit value judgment (neither literally on dogs, nor 
metaphorically on men, nor in both senses on dogs 
and men at once). In fact, we know nothing of the 
original context, but Heraclitus is certainly taking 
up a Homeric theme. In Odyssey 14.30, Eumaeus’ 
guard-dogs bark loudly at Odysseus
18
 disguised as 
a beggar, and later (16.8-10), just before Telema-
chus arrives in Eumaeus’ place, still unrecognized, 
Odysseus says: 
Eumaeus, some good comrade of yours is about 
to arrive 
or at least some other acquaintance, since the 
dogs don’t bark,
but wag their tails. I hear footsteps
19
.
Further on (at 17.326-327), Odysseus’ own 
dog, old Argos, is the only one who silently recog-
nizes him, even in disguise and after twenty years. 
The sequential ordering of these passages is mean-
ingful, as the first two set up the narrative climax of 
the third, which, in turn, anticipates the outcome of 
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Odysseus’ return, when he reveals his true self and 
slays the suitors. Whether or not Heraclitus echoes 
a popular saying
20
, B97 likely reflects a Heraclitean 
reading and appropriation of Homer. If so, in my 
view the Republic II passage would be presenting us 
with a rare instance of Plato reading Heraclitus and 
Heraclitus reading Homer, all at once. One crucial 
question is what exactly the Heraclitean use of the 
Homeric theme might have been. Given the liter-
ary antecedents, the Heraclitean sentence, even if 
complete by itself, still implies something like “but 
they welcome whom they know” (περισσαίνουσι 
δὲ τὸν γνώριμον). Read this way, the primary 
focus seems to be on the ‘subjective’ side: dogs are 
clearly — even if only indirectly — presented as 
relatively intelligent agents. The kind of cognition 
implicitly attributed to dogs involves more than 
sensory perception, and must include memory (so 
perhaps it’d be better rendered by “re-cognition”) 
which eventually, through habituation, becomes 
experience. So, if B97 is in fact a criticism (as op-
posed to a factual observation of dog behavior), 
the sentence might be less about the fierce bark of 
dogs, than about why they bark. If an analogy is 
to work for such a hypothesis, dogs would have to 
be at fault, and fail to recognize a friend, someone 
they already know (rather than rightly identifying 
someone they’ve actually never met as a stranger). 
It might be argued that, by the same token, 
Plato could just have taken the image directly 
from Homer. However, we can safely assume Plato 
knew first-hand Heraclitus’ book. This can be taken 
for granted, within the Republic itself (cf. 497e9-
498b1
21
), and even before (in dialogues such as 
Symposium, Phaedo, and Cratylus), while the fact 
of Plato’s knowledge of Heraclitus’ book is widely 
acknowledged for dialogues of later composition 
(e.g., Theaetetus, Sophist, and Laws). And, for what 
it’s worth, a handful of recurring key-terms further 
strengthens the likelihood that Heraclitus is neither 
being by-passed nor absent from Plato’s mind. In 
the first place, ἦθος occurs in B78 and B119
22
, as 
the epistemic and moral framework of a man’s be-
ing. Second, although certainly not rare in Plato, 
φύσις certainly comes from Heraclitus
23
. Thirdly, as 
already noted, θυμοειδής and θυμός might echo 
Heraclitus’ language in B85
24
.
  
And last but not least, 
ψυχή arguably is, by its own right, a fundamen-
tal part of Heraclitus’ legacy, as the archetypical 
concept of the moral and epistemic subject
25
. On 
the other hand, it’s Plato who brings to the theme 
the word φιλόσοφος, which was probably not in 
Heraclitus’ vocabulary
26
. Apparently, Plato is using 
Heraclitean imagery and language freely and for his 
own purposes, just as he does elsewhere, and as 
Heraclitus had done before with Homeric materials. 
More clues are to be found at the other end of 
the Heraclitean legend. A later epigram
27
 that must 
echo this particular fragment turns Heraclitus’ words 
against himself, calling him “the divine dog who 
barked at the mob” (θεῖον ὑλακτητὴν δήμου 
κύνα)
28
, thus suggesting that the ordinary man of 
the δῆμος (as opposed to the rulers, the powerful 
and the rich) is the object of the original compari-
son. However, the meaning of the word δῆμος in 
Heraclitus B44
29
 is arguably not synonymous with 
“the many”, but refers instead to “the people” as 
the sum total of the free citizens, including both 
the many and the few
30
. The ironical qualification 
of “divine” doesn’t really strengthen the likelihood 
of B97’s being an aristocratic snarl aimed especially 
at the many, but it does imply that it voices an 
important and characteristic aspect of Heraclitus’ 
philosophical and political stance, and points to 
an anthropological scenario (rather than a purely 
zoological one
31
), all the more so since the word 
θεῖον, instead of merely mocking his aristocratic 
arrogance, might mask an implicit third term, hint-
ing at the idea of a proportional relationship, 
as some other fragments do
32
. If we assume the 
Platonic context may point at a similarly political 
application in the original, and try to picture what 
kind of city is depicted in the fragments, we get 
an image of Heraclitus’ polis as structured by a 
threefold proportional ratio: the many (πολλοί, 
referred to with and without the article), the aris-
tocrats (ἄριστοι, B29, unnamed but alluded as 
“the few”, ὀλίγοι, at B104), and the true ἄριστος, 
the one man (εἷς) worth ten-thousand (B49) —the 
best according to Heraclitus’ stricter and markedly 
epistemic standards, at odds with actual practice 
in the real polis of Ephesus.
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On the point that the many are the intended 
objects of the analogy, although very extended since 
ancient times and certainly still dominant today 
among scholars, comparison of B97 with a couple 
other fragments suggests the possibility that Hera-
clitus has in mind the aristocrats, not “the people”: 
B29: For the best (οἱ ἄριστοι) choose a single thing 
instead of all, ever-flowing glory among mortals. But 
the many are satiated like cattle (κτήνεα)
33
. 
B104: What is their intelligence or understanding? 
They believe the bards of the people and take the crowd 
as their teacher, knowing that ‘many are wretched, but 
few are good’
34
.
The dominant interpretation of B29 reads 
it as Heraclitus’ enthusiastic endorsement of the 
aristocratic ruling class, a praise of the nobles for 
their superior choice of a single thing instead of 
all the rest (ἓν ἀντὶ ἁπάντων), and as a typical 
deprecation of the many, who are likened to “cat-
tle” (κτήνεα). Now, whereas the latter point 
can be defensible (with the observation that it 
doesn’t necessarily entail attributing to Heraclitus 
an anti-democratic political position
35
, and that a 
comparison of the many with cattle and dogs, al-
though possible, seems prima facie unlikely), some 
objections can be raised against Heraclitus’ alleged 
aristocratic sympathies, in spite of what may appear 
at first glance. Besides his persistent criticism of 
the many, Heraclitus would seem to align himself 
on the side of the nobles mainly because of the 
assimilation of κλέος and ἕν, which is taken to 
validate allegedly shared aristocratic values
36
. B49, 
“One (man) is <for me> (worth as) ten-thousand, if 
he were the best (εἷς <ἐμοὶ> μύριοι, ἐὰν ἄριστος 
ᾖ, where it should be noted that the reference is 
made conditionally and in the subjunctive, thus sug-
gesting an ideal rather than a factual reality) and 
B33, “It’s also law to obey the will [or ‘counsel’] of 
one (man)” (νόμος καὶ βουλῇ πείθεσθαι ἑνός) 
have often been invoked to reinforce that view. It’s 
questionable, however, to take ἄριστος in B33  so 
flatly, as if it merely meant an aristocrat. As far as 
any one man does personify the true ἄριστος, the 
best candidate must be the shadowy figure of Hermo-
dorus
37
, called “the ablest” (ὀνήιστος) among the 
Ephesians in B121, where the political invective is 
class-blind: “All adult Ephesians would deserve to be 
put to death and leave the city to beardless boys”
38
. 
Furthermore, the object of the choice of 
“the best” in B29, “ever-flowing glory”, is said to 
be ἓν ἀντὶ ἁπάντων, “one thing instead of all”, 
implying a mutual exclusion which doesn’t match 
Heraclitus’ own conception of the rationality of unity 
and totality, paradigmatically expressed elsewhere 
as an identity, ἓν πάντα (B50), and as a cycle or 
a reversible relationship, ἐκ πάντων ἓν καὶ ἐξ 
ἑνὸς πάντα (B10). The phrase κλέος ἀέναον 
might conceal an ironic reference to the aristocratic 
illusion of pursuing immortality through fame, fol-
lowing the model of the Homeric warrior
39
. Even if 
Heraclitus is giving to the aristocrats a better grade 
than to the many, they still ultimately fail the test, 
for from the viewpoint of his ethical intellectual-
ism
40
, it is σωφρονεῖν, “being of a sound mind”, 
not “ever-flowing” fame, that is the mark of ἀρετὴ 
μεγίστη καὶ σοφίη, “supreme excellence and 
wisdom”, according to B112
41
. If αὐτῶν in B104 
refers to the same men who are designated “the 
best” (οἱ ἄριστοι) in B29, then these are probably 
so called ironically.  Ephesian aristocrats, or their 
political operators in the assembly, perhaps even 
the speakers against Hermodorus, seem better can-
didates than the mob to stand for Heraclitus’ barking 
dogs.  Independently of what the reference of ὁ 
δοκιμώτατος is in B28a (“The most reputed of men 
knows and guards mere appearances”: δοκέοντα 
ὁ δοκιμώτατος γινώσκει, φυλάσσει), whether 
it targets an aristocratic type, or individual figures 
of famous poets (say, Homer or Hesiod), the two 
final verbs –which describe the worthlessness of 
the epistemic relationship of the most reputed wise 
man to mere appearances— go well with the image 
of the barking dogs
42
.
B97 voices a connection between dogs not 
recognizing something or someone whose presence 
they perceive beforehand and reactively barking. 
This may plausibly suggest a number of things. For 
instance, that just as good dogs, men in general 
are prone to be mistrustful of people, things or 
ideas they aren’t familiar with (whence the need for 
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adequate rearing and training). Alternatively, Hera-
clitean dogs might be meant to illustrate a special 
(political) case of human ignorance, representing 
traditional figures (likely poets) or maybe even some 
contemporaries who reacted loudly in disapproval 
to Heraclitus’ ideas or sympathies.  In a moral and 
social context, B85 (on the difficulty of fighting 
θυμός and paying with ψυχή) and B43 (on the 
need of extinguishing ὕβρις) might serve to paint 
a fuller picture. Perhaps more to the epistemic point, 
B72 complements the critical analogy of the barking 
dogs with men who live unaware of the λόγος, the 
supreme γνώριμος: 
From that with which they associate 
(ὁμιλοῦσι) most continuously, {the logos that rules 
all things} from that they differ (διαφέρονται), 
and the things they come across (οἷς… ἐγκυροῦσι) 
every day, these appear alien (ξένα) to them
43
. 
The Heraclitean characterization of human life 
as epistemic alienation is here phrased as a failure to 
recognize the known: the unspecified men who are 
the grammatical subject are said to “differ” from that 
which is most familiar, mistaking the evident for the 
alien and unknown. Marcovich thought that λόγος 
“seems to be personified here as a close friend of 
men”
44
, but remains a stranger in their minds. They 
are hopelessly lost in confusion or sunken in deep 
oblivion, and don’t have the first clue about what 
they really know and what they don’t (although they 
will believe otherwise). A richer description of this 
strange ignorance puts the paradox in these terms:
B17: For many men don’t think straight 
(φρονέουσι) about such things as they meet with, 
nor do they know (γινώσκουσιν) after having 
learned (μαθόντες) them, but fancy (δοκέουσι) 
themselves they do
45.
The general paradox, already explicit in 
B1’s contrast of the λόγος and the ἀξύνετοι 
ἄνθρωποι, is thus carefully developed: that which 
is most knowable and always nearby, remains unrec-
ognized (B72). Men are alienated from that which 
is ever present (τὸ μὴ δῦνόν ποτε, B16), they 
make no sense of “such things as they meet with” 
(ὁκοίοις ἐγκυρεῦσιν), and fall painfully short of 
φρόνησις (B2) and γνῶσις (B56), prisoners of 
their own defective μάθησις and self-serving δόξα 
(B17), believing themselves they know what they 
don’t. Not even the poets and sages reputed as wis-
est (B40, B42, B56, B57) would pass the epistemic 
test, and all are declared to be “separated from” 
or “cut off” from wisdom (σοφόν ἐστι πάντων 
κεχωρισμένον, B108). 
With this sketch of the background in mind, 
I suggest the Heraclitean use of the image of dogs 
was meant to stress human epistemic alienation 
regarding the λόγος, mirroring and substantially 
modifying the Homeric treatment of the theme of 
an unrecognized Odysseus back in Ithaca. If the 
saying had a sharper edge and implied specifically a 
political criticism, aristocrats need not be excluded, 
and can reasonably be seen as equally likely targets 
as the many. Heraclitus’ political model is centered 
in the supremacy of the law and is structured by an 
axiological threefold proportional ratio: the many 
relate to the few as the few relate to the one. The 
middle term thus appears simultaneously as better 
than the lower extreme and as worse than the higher. 
The Platonic context suggests a very similar model 
in the image of the flock, the guard-dogs and the 
shepherd. Plato’s use of the image of dogs may be 
thus reminiscent, not only of Heraclitus’ image, but 
also of his political model. Both uses of the image 
are irreducible, but they are also strikingly similar, 
and this fact suggests a deeper, more complex philo-
sophical affinity than the rather simplistic, negative 
and condescending view of Heraclitus with which 
Plato is usually credited, an affinity which can be 
substantiated by the texts themselves and consider-
ably expanded. The task is waiting for an updated 
critical assessment from current scholarship. 
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Endnotes
1  I’m referring to the so-called “Universal Flux theory” (πάντα ῥεῖ), which 
stems from Plato’s Cratylus and Theaetetus, but is not backed by Heraclitus’ 
ipsissima verba. Plato’s image of Heraclitus’ river (δὶς ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν 
οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης), which often passes as genuine, is likely an imitation of 
Heraclitus B12, rather than an actual quotation or a close paraphrase of a 
different original version of the river-statement; cf. Hülsz 2009. For a thorough 
and updated discussion of the issue, see Fronterotta (2012; 2013, p. 83-93), 
and his contribution in this volume.
2  Including the famous passages in the Sophist on the Ionian and Sicilian 
Muses and Eryximachus’ speech in the Symposium (where the reference to 
Heraclitus is unmistakable and explicit), as well as many others in which 
Heraclitus is alluded to (like the so-called ‘cyclic argument’ in the Phaedo, 
and Diotima’s treatment of mortal nature in the Symposium, possibly the 
most widely recognized). I’ve briefly touched upon some Platonic relevant 
cases, from Apology to Sophist, cf. Hülsz (2003a; 2003b; 2009; 2011; 2013a).
3  Cf. R. II, 477a ff. Criticism of the epic poets is a central issue for the first 
outline of what the right paideia for the proto-guardians should be. 
4  Cf. DK21 B10, B11, B12, B14, B15 and B16. Xenophanes’ criticism of Homer 
and Hesiod is grounded on the falsity of their anthropomorphic conception of 
the divine and their depiction of the actions of the gods as outright immoral.
5  Cf. DK22 B40, B42, B56, B57. Heraclitus’ basic criticism of Homer and 
Hesiod is centered on their epistemic shortcomings regarding unity (rather 
than on the moral implications of myths), but Xenophanes is also targeted as 
a polymath lacking true understanding. On the subject of Heraclitus’ criticism 
of Homer (and Archilochus) in B42, see H. Granger (2009).
6  The τρυφῶσα or φλεγμαίνουσα πόλις, contrasted explicitly with the 
first one, so austere as to lack any rulers, which is called by Glaucon a “city 
of pigs” (ὑῶν πόλιν, 372d4), but is characterized by Socrates as  “the true 
city” (ἡ… ἀληθινὴ πόλις), the “healthy” one (ὑγιής) at 372e.
7  Cf. 416a: δεινότατον γάρ που πάντων καὶ αἴσχιστον ποιμέσι 
τοιούτους γε καὶ οὕτω τρέφειν κύνας ἐπικούρους ποιμνίων, ὥστε 
ὑπὸ ἀκολασίας ἢ λιμοῦ ἤ τινος ἄλλου κακοῦ ἔθους αὐτοὺς τοὺς 
κύνας ἐπιχειρῆσαι τοῖς προβάτοις κακουργεῖν καὶ ἀντὶ κυνῶν 
λύκοις ὁμοιωθῆναι.
8  374a9-b2: ἀνδρεῖος δὲ εἶναι ἆρα ἐθελήσει ὁ μὴ θυμοειδὴς εἴτε ἵππος 
εἴτε κύων ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν ζῷον; ἢ οὐκ ἐννενόηκας ὡς ἄμαχόν τε καὶ 
ἀνίκητον θυμός, οὗ παρόντος ψυχὴ πᾶσα πρὸς πάντα ἄφοβός τέ 
ἐστι καὶ ἀήττητος. The explicit mention of θυμός ‘being present in’ ψυχή 
testifies to an intimate connection among the two. This fits closely enough 
the text of Heraclitus’ B85 (on which see below, note 24).
9  Indeed, θυμός as the seat of passions, feelings, and desires is the root 
idea in both the denominations of the spirited and desiderative ‘parts’ of the 
irrational soul (τὸ θυμοειδές and τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν), as opposed to reason 
(ὁ λόγος and τὸ λογιστικόν) in book IV. 
10  Plato, R. II, 375e1-376c5 (my translation). I have suppressed the narrative 
references to both voices (‘I said’, ‘he said’), and italicized the words closest 
to the text of DK22 B97.
11  Many editions of the Republic pass over the passage in silence. Guthrie 
(1975, p. 450, n. 1) briefly summarized it and was satisfied to observe that 
Plato “had a sense of humour”. In Cornford’s (1945) view the image is of little 
significance; but cf. Tait (1949, p. 205, n. 3). Annas (1981, p. 80) found it 
“disconcerting” that Plato’s “sole ground” for his claim about the educability 
of the Guardians “is an analogy with animals”. See also Sinclair (1948); and 
Saxonhouse (1978, esp. p. 892-895). Ferrari (2007, p. 184-ff) recognizes the 
recurrence of the comparison of dogs and Guardians in the Republic, briefly 
paraphrasing the passage of book II, but is silent about the possibility that 
Heraclitus’ fragments 85 and 97 may be in the background there; later on 
(p. 188, n. 18), though, he insightfully brings in the image of the harmony 
of bow and lyre from Heraclitus B51 in his interpretation of the three-part 
soul at the end of book IV.  
12  This can be further analyzed as ‘lover of knowing’ and ‘lover of the known’, 
cf. Tait (1949, p. 207).
13  Adam (1902, note ad loc.) refers to Brandt  (Zur Entwick. d. Pl. Lehr. v. 
d. Seelentheilen, p. 10) who “ingeniously takes φιλόσοφον as = σοφὸν 
τοὺς φίλους”. 
14  This was the opinion of Sinclair (1948). See further on the philosophic 
significance and importance of the passage, Tait (1949, p. 203-211).
15  I’m aware only of four authors that have noticed this. Adam (1903) 
does mark the possible reference to DK22 B97 (and to B85 at 374a-b, with 
a reference to Ast), after pointing to a couple of very interesting parallels 
in the Odyssey (16.4 and 14.30, see below), without further developing the 
issue; Láscaris (1958, p. 338-ff.); and M. Pabón and Fernández Galiano (1981, 
notes ad loc.), following closely Adam.
16  DK22 B97: κύνες γὰρ καὶ βαΰζουσιν ὃν ἂν μὴ γινώσκωσι. (The 
version here assumed keeps the mss. readings rather than the emended 
text printed in DK). I keep καὶ as part of the quotation and interpret it in 
adverbial sense (‘just’, ‘precisely’), after Marcovich (1967), who translates, 
however: “Dogs only [and not men] are accustomed to bark at everyone they 
don’t know”. I also keep γὰρ, usually excised by editors, after Mouraviev 
(2006, ad loc.) Marcovich saw B97 as an appropriation of a popular saying 
and declared its meaning to be unclear, conjecturing it might be read as a 
reply to the Ephesians’ unkind reception of Heraclitus’ paradoxical teaching.
17  Plutarch’s use of Heraclitus here (An seni sit gerenda res publica) seems 
merely ornamental (cf.  HERSHBELL, 1977, p. 191). Nevertheless, a fuller 
political reference in the Heraclitean original might be reflected less literally 
in the context immediately after the quotation, on the subject of the envy 
that affects young politicians, at first blocking their way to successful action, 
but then yielding and itself prospering in them, through love of glory (787c8-
10): …καθ' Ἡράκλειτον, καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀρχόμενον ὥσπερ ἐν θύραις 
τοῦ βήματος μάχεται καὶ πάροδον οὐ δίδωσι· τὴν δὲ σύντροφον καὶ 
συνήθη δόξαν οὐκ ἀγρίως οὐδὲ χαλεπῶς ἀλλὰ πράως ἀνέχεται (“…
and at first, at the entrance to the tribune, [envy] fights and gives no passage, 
but then she upholds that familiar and habitual glory neither savagely nor 
harshly, but gently”). This recalls the language and the general sense of the 
use of the image in the passage from R. II, and so, it would seem to indirectly 
confirm the Heraclitean connection there.
18  Od. 14. 29-30: ἐξαπίνης δ' Ὀδυσῆα ἴδον κύνες ὑλακόμωροι. / 
οἱ μὲν κεκλήγοντες ἐπέδραμον… (“Suddenly the barking dogs, seeing 
Odysseus, / ran upon him with loud barking…”)
19  Od. 16.8-10: Εὔμαι', ἦ μάλα τίς τοι ἐλεύσεται ἐνθάδ' ἑταῖρος / ἢ καὶ 
γνώριμος ἄλλος, ἐπεὶ κύνες οὐχ ὑλάουσιν, / ἀλλὰ περισσαίνουσι· 
ποδῶν δ' ὑπὸ δοῦπον ἀκούω.
20  Cf. Láscaris (1958) and Marcovich (1967). It’s noteworthy that none quote 
any parallels or give further indications of this. See notes 12 and 13 above.
21  For an approach to this passage, see Hülsz (2012).
22  DK22 B78: ἦθος γὰρ ἀνθρώπειον μὲν οὐκ ἔχει γνώμας, θεῖον δὲ 
ἔχει. DK22 B119: ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων.
23  Heraclitus’ is the earliest philosophical use of the word, both as a 
grammatical subject and in adverbial use, denoting the objective ontological 
rational and unitary structure of things in general, man included). φύσις 
occurs in DK22 B1, [B106], B112 and B123. B1: …κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων 
ἕκαστον: B106: …ὡς ἀγνοῦντι [sc. Ἡσιόδῳ] φύσιν ἡμέρας ἁπάσης 
μίαν οὖσαν; B112: …ἀληθέα λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαΐοντας; 
B123: φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ. For a closer look, including the only Homeric 
use of the term, see Hülsz (2013).
24  DK22 B85: θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χαλεπόν· ὅ <τι> γὰρ ἂν θέλῃ, ψυχῆς 
ὠνεῖται. It’s not easy to even make out what the primary relevant meaning 
of the term θυμός is here (“anger” and “heart” -as the seat of desire and 
strong emotions- are the most recurring choices in translations); the semantic 
range covers the notions of the self, the seat of life, feeling and thinking, 
so in a large measure, the meanings overlap with those of ψυχή, to which it 
is linked and opposed here. The Heraclitean image would seem to be about 
selfhood, and the hard battle, an inner one, roughly anticipating Plato’s 
contrast of rational and irrational parts of the human soul. Cf. Democritus 
B236, which must be a quotation of and a comment on this very fragment: 
θυμῷ μάχεσθαι μὲν χαλεπόν· ἀνδρὸς δὲ τὸ κρατέειν εὐλογίστου. 
It’s thus tempting to read B85 together with B97; see notes 8 and 9 above 
about B85’s echo at 374a-b.
25  Cf. the relevant ‘psychic’ fragments: DK22 B45, B107, B115, B117 and 
B118.
26  DK22 B35: χρὴ γὰρ εὖ μάλα πολλῶν ἵστορας φιλοσόφους ἄνδρας 
εἶναι (only the words in italics are likely to come from Heraclitus). The 
phrase φιλοσόφους ἄνδρας probably is an interpolation by Clement, but if 
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authentic, then this would be the earliest recorded use of the word φιλόσοφος 
in the Greek language — and the only one in the whole Pre-Socratic tradition! 
—, though it would not refer to Heraclitus’ own procedure.
27  The epigram (Anthologia Graeca 7.479, framed as an epitaph for his 
tombstone) is attributed to Theodoridas (3rd century B.C.): Πέτρος ἐγὼ 
τὸ πάλαι γυρὴ καὶ ἄτριπτος ἐπιβλὴς / τὴν Ἡρακλείτου ἔνδον 
ἔχω κεφαλήν· /αἰών μ' ἔτριψεν κροκάλαις ἴσον· ἐν γὰρ ἀμάξῃ 
/ παμφόρῳ αἰζηῶν εἰνοδίη τέταμαι. / ἀγγέλλω δὲ βροτοῖσι, καὶ 
ἄστηλός περ ἐοῦσα, /  θεῖον ὑλακτητὴν δήμου ἔχουσα κύνα. [“I, 
a stone long ago rounded and an unworn epibles, / Hold within the head of 
Heraclitus. /Great age has worn me like the shingle, for in a wagon path / 
Bearing all humans I am stretched out in the roadway.  / But I announce to 
humans — even though I don't have a stele —   / That I hold the divine dog 
who barked at the mob.” (transl. STEFFEN, 2002, p. 162.)]
28  A move which seems rather common-place and recalls a well-known version 
of his death (D. L. 9.4: Νεάνθης δ' ὁ Κυζικηνός φησι μὴ δυνηθέντα 
αὐτὸν ἀποσπάσαι τὰ βόλιτα μεῖναι καὶ διὰ τὴν μεταβολὴν 
ἀγνοηθέντα κυνόβρωτον γενέσθαι, in which dogs devour an excrement-
covered Heraclitus because they don’t recognize him.
29  B44: Μάχεσθαι χρὴ τὸν δῆμον ὑπὲρ τοῦ νόμου ὅκωσπερ τείχεος: 
“The people must fight in defense of the law as (they do) for the city wall”. 
The only other Heraclitean use of the word is in B104, δήμων ἀοιδοῖσι, in 
the plural, where it probably means “the towns”.
30  Cf. Senzasono (1996, p. 66, n. 48), who writes, quoting Mazzarino 
(Fra Oriente e Occidente, Firenze 1947: 231): “il dêmos nel VII secolo è lo 
stato ‘e sempre continuerò ad avere questo senso’. Si tratta appunto di un 
ambito costituzionale ‘dove tutti i liberi partecipano alla vita della polis’”; 
cf. Fronterotta (2013, p. 306-307) for a different view, more in line with the 
traditional interpretation of Heraclitus’ ‘aristocratic’ politics.
31  Several Heraclitean fragments deal with animals in one way or another. 
Excluding B97, B67 (the comparison of the soul to the spider, in latin and 
probably not genuine, pace Nussbaum 1972) and the lice of B56, here is 
a list: B4: boves felices diceremus cum inveniant orobum ad comedendum; 
B9: ὄνους σύρματα ἂν ἑλέσθαι μᾶλλον ἤ χρυσόν; B11: πᾶν γὰρ 
ἑρπετόν πληγῇ νέμεται; B13: ὕες γοῦν βορβόρῳ ἥδονται μᾶλλον 
ἢ καθαρῷ ὕδατι; B29: οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ κεκόρηνται ὅκωσπερ κτήνεα; 
B37: sues caeno cohortales aves pulveri lavari; B61: ἰχθύσι μὲν πότιμον 
καὶ σωτήριον, ἀνθρώποις δὲ ἄποτον καὶ ὀλέθριον; B82: πιθήκων ὁ 
κάλλιστος αἰσχρὸς ἀνθρώπων γένει συμβάλλειν; B83: ἀνθρώπων 
ὁ σοφώτατος πρὸς θεὸν πίθηκος φανεῖται καὶ σοφίῃ καὶ κάλλει καὶ 
τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν.
32  In particular, see B78 (about the internal distinction of a ‘human’ 
character —ἦθος ἀνθρώπειον— and a ‘divine’ one —θεῖον— on the 
basis of γνώμας ἔχειν), B79 (featuring the ratio παῖς / ἀνήρ / δαίμων), 
B82 and B83. Kahn (1979, p. 175) presents and comments B97 together 
with B87 (on the fool who gets excited at every λόγος) with the intention 
“to suggest a simile or ratio: as dogs react to strangers, so do foolish men 
to every logos”. I sympathize with this line of approach, but the intended 
analogy with B87 doesn’t seem to fit well: dogs are aggressively active and 
discriminating, whereas fools are passive and the opposite of discriminating; 
and the unrecognized strangers are a mismatch for ‘every’ logos.
33  DK22 B29: αἱρεῦνται γὰρ ἓν ἀντὶ ἁπάντων οἱ ἄριστοι, κλέος 
ἀέναον θνητῶν· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ κεκόρηνται ὅκωσπερ κτήνεα.  My 
rendering takes θνητῶν as masculine: “ever-flowing glory among (or simply, 
of) mortal men”. The syntax admits more than one construction: “The best 
choose one thing, ever-flowing glory, instead of all mortal things” (with 
ἁπάντων … θνητῶν in hyperbaton), or “The best choose one thing 
instead of all, ever-flowing glory instead of mortal things”, as if ἀντὶ was 
implicitly understood between ἀέναον and θνητῶν. One could punctuate 
after ἀέναον, as Mouraviev (2006) does: “The best choose one thing instead 
of all, ever-flowing glory. But of mortal things the many are satiated like 
cattle”. Cf. especially Sider (2013, p. 327): “The entire fragment has always 
been read as if the two clauses were in complete contrast, although there is 
in fact no evidence for a μέν in the first clause. Thus, instead of a contrast 
between the upper and lower classes, as is usually understood, the second 
clause, following the first as explained above, can now be rendered ‘and the 
majority [sc. of them, the aristoi] glut themselves like cattle.’ In other words, 
Heraclitean ethics loves to hide. οἱ ἄριστοι are not in fact ἄριστοι, and some 
of them are no better than οἱ πολλοὶ, the people they generally despise. 
Thus, although Heraclitus may not be a friend of οἱ πολλοὶ, neither is he to 
be taken as a staunch defender of the upper classes.” 
34  DK22 B104 (Proclus, in Alc., p. 255, 15): τίς γὰρ αὐτῶν νόος ἢ φρήν; 
δήμων ἀοιδοῖσι πείθονται καὶ διδασκάλωι χρείωνται ὁμίλωι εἰδότες 
ὅτι ‘οἱ πολλοὶ κακοί, ὀλίγοι δὲ ἀγαθοί’. I suppress οὐκ before εἰδότες, 
after Clement’s version (Strom. 5.9.59.1-5). About the aristocrats being the 
intended targets of B104, see García Quintela (1992, p. 80-ff.): “...el sujeto 
del fragmento es la aristocracia de Éfeso a la que se reprocha su mímesis 
con el pueblo” (p. 83). In support of this, the author quotes Theognis 
(665-6 and 797-8). Marcovich (1967, ad loc.) believes that αὐτῶν means 
the Ephesian rulers. For Kahn (1979, p. 175) it refers to men generally (“the 
mass of mankind”). Heraclitus’ criticism of Ephesian aristocracy is further 
documented in B121 and B125a.
35  Cf. Vlastos (1947, p. 166-168), where he held that Heraclitus shouldn’t 
be credited with an “aristocratic politics”. Acknowledging that he was “a 
misfit in Ephesian politics” (p. 166), Vlastos writes:  “If our meager evidence 
permits any hypothesis concerning Heracleitus' political sympathies, it would 
be that he favored the limited democracy of the past. This is in line with his 
known admiration for Bias of Priene, who figures in the tradition as an early 
democratic statesman” (p. 167) and such a view doesn’t really contradict his 
“contempt for the folly of the crowd” (p. 166), since “[t]he  "many"  are  not 
the  demos  but  all  who  fail  to meet  the  austere  standards  of  Heracleitean 
wisdom, including the  illustrious  company  of  Homer,  Hesiod, Archilochus, 
Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Hecataeus” (p. 166, n.106). 
36  Kahn (1979, p. 233-234) observes that “[t]he terms of heroic choice 
recall the cosmic value of fire which, like gold, serves as payment for all 
things (XL,D.90): 'one thing in exchange for all'” (p. 233), thus establishing 
“a formal parallel between the aim of a noble life and the omnivalent principle 
of fire” (p. 234). His observation is valid in so far as it concerns the contrast 
of two correlative moral paradigms, but doesn’t necessarily imply Heraclitus’ 
anti-democratic or pro-aristocratic political stance. The analogy of all human 
laws and the single cosmic divine one on which they depend appears in a 
different context (B114), dealing with the ξυνὸν πάντων, which surely 
stands for the λόγος (cf. B2: τοῦ λόγου δ' ἐόντος ξυνοῦ).
37  About Hermodorus, see Mouraviev (2003, p. 138-140) and Caballero 
(2008, p. 10-21).
38  B121: ἄξιον ᾿ Εφεσίοις ἡβηδὸν ἀποθανεῖν πᾶσι, καὶ τοῖς ἀνήβοις 
τὴν πόλιν καταλιπεῖν, οἵτινες ῾ Ερμόδωρον ἄνδρα ἑωυτῶν ὀνήιστον 
ἐξέβαλον λέγοντες· ἡμέων μηδὲ εἷς ὀνήιστος ἔστω· εἰ δὲ τις τοιοῦτοις, 
ἄλλῃ τε καὶ μετ᾿ ἄλλων. I quote Diogenes Laertius’ version (Strabo’s is 
shorter and gives ἀπάγξασθαι instead of ἀποθανεῖν). Although the final 
words of B121 give democratic equality as the Ephesians’ justification for 
exiling their ablest citizen, aristocrats need not be excluded from participating. 
B125a, on the other hand, which looks like a comment on B125, is clearly 
directed against the wealthy: μὴ ἐπιλίποι ὑμᾶς πλοῦτος, Ἐφέσιοι, ἵν' 
ἐξελέγχοισθε πονηρευόμενοι (“May richess not abandon you, Ephesians, 
so that you are convicted of your wicked doings!”).  An unflattering contrast 
between an adult male and an a παῖς ἄνηβος recurs in B117. See further 
the praise of the true ἄριστος, the one with a soul endowed with wisdom, 
in B118: αὐγὴ ξηρὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη. 
39  Cf. Sider (2013, p. 326); “ever-flowing fame all by itself would be a 
suspect phrase all by itself; add the word θνητῶν and it seems to lose 
all positive force”. Implicit criticism of warrior morality is possible in B24 
(ἀρηιφάτους θεοὶ τιμῶσι καὶ ἄνθρωποι) and B25 (μόροι γὰρ μέζονες 
μέζονας μοίρας λαγχάνουσι).
40  Cf. Sider (2013), whose views on the subject I largely share. He concludes 
his thorough survey with the idea that Heraclitus’ is an “intellectualist theory of 
ethics”, “one that should remind us of that found later in Plato, especially in the 
Republic” (p. 333), observing that in spite of hermeneutical risks “the similarities 
between the two are striking”, and finally wondering “whether there was more 
in the lost parts of Heraclitus’ ethics that would strike us as Platonic” (p. 334).
41  In spite of doubts about its authenticity (based on the unusual language), 
B112 (from Stobaeus) can be prudently considered genuine at least in what 
regards the content. Cf. Hülsz (2013b, p. 184). 
42  A connection with B63 (ἔνθα δ᾿ ἐόντι ἐπανίστασθαι καὶ φύλακας 
γίνεσθαι ἐγερτὶ ζώντων καὶ νεκρῶν) is not impossible, but this fragment 
presents its own problems for interpretation. An eschatological reading of 
B97, read together with B63 (as the one García Quintela 1992, p. 222, n. 55 
proposes) seems unlikely to me.
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43  DK22 B72 (from Marcus Aurelius): ὧι μάλιστα διηνεκῶς ὁμιλοῦσι, 
{λόγῳ τῷ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦντι} τούτωι διαφέρονται, καὶ οἷς καθ' ἡμέραν 
ἐγκυροῦσι, ταῦτα αὐτοῖς ξένα φαίνεται. Assuming it’s not a mere 
paraphrase, it’s hard to say how far the intended quotation extends to (i. e., 
if it includes λόγῳ and the final words or not); Marcovich considered the 
whole last clause as belonging to Marcus; he was certainly right concerning 
οἷς καθ' ἡμέραν ἐγκυροῦσι, which looks like an echo of τοιαῦτα … 
ὁκοίοις ἐγκυρεῦσιν in B17 (see below, note 45). The point at the core of 
this criticism of the many is the paradox that they ignore what they already 
know, or to put it another way, the common (ξυνός) remains for them a 
stranger (ξένος). So even if the authentic text didn’t mention λόγος, 
Marcus’ Stoicizing interpolated reference to it is probably on the right track. 
44  MARCOVICH, 1967, p. 18. It’s noteworthy the similar ambivalent use of 
the pronouns in both B72 and B97.
45  DK22 B17: οὐ γὰρ φρονέουσι τοιαῦτα πολλοί, ὁκοίοις ἐγκυρεῦσιν, 
οὐδὲ μαθόντες γινώσκουσιν, ἑωυτοῖσι δὲ δοκέουσι. For an overview of 
λόγος in the fragments, cf. Hülsz (2013c).
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